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POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CURRENCY QUESTION 1945-1947*
Robert Cribb
Currency problems may seem at first to have little to do with revolution, but 
during the early years of the Indonesian Revolution circumstances were such that 
currency became a major element in the struggle between the opposing parties. In 
fact, the conflict over currency had such wide-ranging political implications that it 
was one of the reasons behind the Dutch decision to launch their first "Police Ac­
tion" against the Republic in July 1947.
This contest over currency was made possible by the strategic geography of 
the Dutch-Indonesian conflict. In the aftermath of World War II and the Japanese 
occupation of Indonesia, Allied (Australian) forces had succeeded in restoring Kali­
mantan (Borneo) and most of the islands of East Indonesia to the Dutch without 
great difficulty. On Java and Sumatra, however, a shortage of forces and deter­
mined opposition from the Republicans had confined Allied (British and British In­
dian) forces, which had arrived at the end of September 1945, to three urban en­
claves on Sumatra (Medan, Padang, and Palembang), and three and a half (Jakarta 
[Batavia], Semarang, and Surabaya, plus the northern half of Bandung) on Java. 
For both political and military reasons, the British did not remove the Indonesian 
Republican government apparatus present in these cities on their arrival, and in­
deed prevented the Dutch from attempting to do so. The effect was to give the 
cities an ambiguous status, on the one hand Dutch, for the Dutch were members of 
the Allies and had been confirmed as sovereign power by the San Francisco Confer 
ence of April-June 1945; but also Indonesian, for there was clearly no future for 
these cities distinct from their Javanese and Sumatran hinterlands then under the 
control of the Republic. As Dutch-dominated enclaves with a strong Republican 
presence and continuing ties with the Republican government, the cities offered 
considerable scope for conflict. *I
* This paper is based on material collected in Britain, The Netherlands, and the 
United States from 1979 to 1981, as part of my research for a forthcoming doctoral dis­
sertation on Jakarta during the Indonesian Revolution. Information and examples, 
therefore, are drawn especially from the experience of that city. Sources so far 
consulted have unfortunately not permitted an investigation of monetary policy 
making within the Republic as detailed as that for the Dutch and British. I hope 
to correct these imbalances after further research.
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This competition did not merely lie in either side's seizing opportunities to dem­
onstrate its power. From the beginning a major part of the Republic's strategic re­
sponse to the Dutch return had been diplomatic. While firmly opposing the Dutch 
in principle, they attempted to enlist the Allies and the United Nations (the two 
were seen as much the same thing), if not as supporters then at least as disinter­
ested arbiters. This attempt did not produce the desired result, and it soon became 
clear that there would be a protracted struggle. Greater emphasis was then laid on 
the development of the economy and the Republican state apparatus, both to streng­
then the Republic's ability to meet the Dutch diplomatically and militarily and to en­
sure that the growth of Dutch power could be halted. At the same time, the Dutch 
were convinced of the necessity to restore the pattern of efficient administration on 
which they had prided themselves before the war. They believed the quality of 
their rule to be their strongest point in any comparison with the Republic, and 
they, too, concentrated on developing the economy and administration of the areas 
they controlled. Since money lies at the heart o f such matters, conflict in the field 
of currency became inevitable.
Both the Republic and the Dutch faced a situation where the currency was seri­
ously affected by three-and-a-half years of Japanese occupation. At the beginning 
of their occupation, the Japanese had issued a temporary occupation currency 
[gunpyo], nominally at par with the prewar guilder. In March 1943, notes of the 
Nanpo Kaihatsu Kinko [Southern Development Bank], produced in Kolff's printing 
works in Jakarta and known generally as oeang Djepang, or oeang pisang [banana 
money] from the bananas which were a prominent part of their design, were brought 
into circulation and at the same time the Japanese issued instructions that all pre­
war currency was to be handed in to them.1 This regulation was far from strictly 
enforced, and even Dutch internees continued to be able to use their savings to 
buy food and other necessities from Indonesian and Chinese sellers. As the Japa­
nese authorities printed and spent increasing amounts of money, however, serious 
inflation began. Prices rose rapidly, exacerbated by a wartime shortage of goods. 1 2 
People hoarded the old Netherlands Indies currency as a security against the depre­
ciation of the Japanese guilder and the possibility of a Japanese defeat. At the end 
of the war, therefore, transactions were almost universally conducted in Japanese 
notes, which were politically unpopular and the value of which continued to depre­
ciate rapidly.
In a presidential proclamation on October 3, 1945, Sukarno recognized both 
prewar Netherlands Indies currency and Japanese occupation currency as legal 
tender. 3 Soon afterwards, however, A. A. Maramis, the Minister of Finance in
1. J. E. Spinosa Cattela, "Monetaire problemen in Indie," Economisch-Statistische 
Berichten, 30, no. 1490, (November 29, 1945), p. 262.
2. For a comparison of prices of basic items in 1942 and in February 1946, see Star 
Weekly [Jakarta], February 10, 1946; for figures on the increase in circulation of 
Japanese currency during the occupation, see Spinosa Cattela, "Monetaire proble­
men," p. 262. Figures on the gross circulation of currency from 1942 on can give 
no more than a general indication of the state of affairs, for there is no way to ac­
count for the loss or destruction of notes. Nor has it always been possible to dis­
tinguish between circulations on Java, on Sumatra, and in East Indonesia, which 
remained administratively separate and economically largely isolated throughout the 
Japanese occupation, although all these areas used the same currency, with the 
exception o f a f.100 note issued only on Sumatra.
3. Merdeka [Jakarta], October 5, 1945.
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Sukarno's presidential cabinet, was making plans to issue a new Republican cur­
rency (oeang Republik Indonesia, or ORI). The chief problem, as Maramis saw it 
at the time, was an abundance of money in the economy. According to his esti­
mates, the Japanese had put f.2,200 million into circulation, f. 1,570 of it on Java 
and Madura. There were an additional f.462.5 million or so in Java Bank and pre­
war Netherlands Indies government currency notes, which had been in circulation 
when the war began and which, although no longer circulating, were beyond the 
control o f any government. He argued that, since the Allies would not recognize 
the Japanese currency and since it would be overoptimistic to expect the Dutch to 
back their currency with the gold reserves they had removed to Australia just be­
fore the Japanese invasion, the Republic itself must be responsible for creating the 
stable monetary conditions necessary for economic recovery. He proposed that both 
Japanese and prewar Netherlands Indies currency be accepted for exchange at par 
against yet-to-be-issued Republican guilders, or rupiah. In order to keep circula­
tion manageable, however, those paying in would receive at most only 5 percent of 
the value of their money; the rest would be a national loan, repayable in fifty to 
seventy-five years, and bearing interest at 2 percent. **
Maramis' plans were cast within the framework o f a Republican vision of the fu­
ture, but they were not really revolutionary, in that they were not directed against 
specific Dutch monetary or other policies, and indeed assumed an absence of posi­
tive Dutch monetary policies. Sukarno had in fact tried to influence the Allies by 
urging Mountbatten to announce officially that Japanese currency would be recog­
nized at par with prewar Netherlands Indies currency.4 5 The initial preparations 
for issuing ORI, therefore, were an administrative rather than a political act, al­
though the propaganda value of currency was well recognized. The notes, printed 
in Jakarta at the state printing works and dated October 17, 1945, bore a portrait 
of Sukarno and a picture of an erupting volcano, reportedly Sukarno's metaphor of 
the Revolution as a fiery, destructive outburst which leaves the surrounding land 
fertile once it is over. 6 According to British intelligence reports, there were firm 
plans to issue the new currency on February 1, 1946, and a few of the notes ap­
peared in the markets in Jakarta before this. 7 The majority, however, reportedly 
three metric tons in weight, were captured by the Allies in mid-January 1946, when 
they occupied the state printing works. 8 The plates, however, were apparently 
saved, for, when the ORI was finally issued officially nine months later, in October 
1946, the notes were of the same design, signed by Maramis, and dated October 17, 
1945.
4. E. T. Kuiper [Department of Finance liaison officer with Allied Headquarters], 
note [c. January 1946], in S. L. van der Wal, e d . , Offfciele bescheiden betreffende 
de Nederlands-lndonesische betrekkingen 1945-1950 [hereafter OBB] ,  8 vols.to date 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971-), 3, pp. 148-49n.
5. Sukarno to Mountbatten, September 30, 1945, OBB, 1, p. 206.
6. H. Natasuwarna, "The Indonesian Revolution and the Paper Money Issued during 
that Period" (typescript, 1979, in my possession), p. 4.
7. Foreign Office [hereafter FO] file no. 371/53774; Nieuwsgier [Batavia], January 
16, 1946.
8. HQ, 23 Ind. Div., Bandung, "Weekly Intelligence Summary, no. 13," February 
6, 1946, Algemeen Rijksarchief [hereafter ARA], archief Procureur-Generaal bij 
het Hooggerechtshof in Nederlandsch-Indie [hereafter Proc. Gen.], 549; OBB, 3, 
pp. 148-49n.
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On the Dutch side the question of the postwar currency for the Netherlands 
Indies had been raised within the Netherlands government-in-exile in London as 
early as August 1942. The Netherlands Indies had had its own currency before 
the war, with the semiofficial Java Bank issuing bank notes and the government 
itself issuing coins and currency notes [muntbiljetten] . The currency had been 
linked to, but distinct from, that of The Netherlands, and in 1942 it was proposed 
that the tie be loosened somewhat in expectation of postwar constitutional changes.
It was decided that the Netherlands Indies guilder would be replaced by a specifi­
cally Indies currency, a decision that, it seems, was less a political than an economic 
and financial one, for, despite a certain amount of argument in favor of an Indies 
design for the new Indies currency, van Mook, then Minister of Colonies in the gov­
ernment-in-exile, decided to retain the old, purely Dutch design. 9 Attention had to 
be given, however, not only to the eventual financial character of the Netherlands 
Indies currency but to the more pressing problem of monetary rehabilitation imme­
diately after the war. Direct government monetary authority was viewed as neces­
sary to avoid a period of monetary chaos, and on March 2, 1943, the Netherlands 
Indies government was authorized by royal decree to issue currency notes of f.5  
and higher. The distinctive feature of such notes was that, unlike bank notes, 
they were not backed by the gold reserves of a circulation bank but, like coins, 
simply bore their value on the authority of the government that issued them. The 
notes themselves were printed in the United States by the American Bank Note Com­
pany. It was presumably the completion or part completion of this printing which 
enabled the government to proceed in February 1944 with the logical corollary of 
its original decision: the removal from the Java Bank of the right to issue currency.
Like so many other Dutch plans concerning the reoccupation of Indonesia, those 
for the withdrawal of the Japanese occupation currency and the introduction of the 
800 million or so gouvernementsgulden, printed in America but already brought 
over to Australia, were thrown into confusion when the Japanese surrendered on 
August 14, 1945, while still in control o f most of the archipelago. The relatively 
small administrative apparatus the Netherlands Indies government-in-exile had set 
up in Australia, which as part of the Allied forces had become the Netherlands In­
dies Civil Administration (NICA), was geared to restoring Dutch authority piece­
meal, as areas were liberated by the advancing Allies. This had indeed occurred 
reasonably smoothly in those areas captured before the Japanese surrender--Hollan- 
dia, Biak, Morotai, Balikpapan, and Tarakan.10 There NICA had been able to es­
tablish an administration, introduce the new currency (known generally as Nica- 
geld, oeang Nica, or, from its color, oeang merah--red money), and dump at sea 
stores of Japanese currency notes. Such action, however, could not be taken 
throughout all of Indonesia at once and in Brisbane,on the eve of the Japanese sur­
render, presumably in anticipation of the official announcement, it was decided not 
to declare the Japanese currency worthless immediately, principally on the grounds 
that there was no prompt way of substituting NICA money for i t . 11 It was consid­
ered better to postpone briefly the return to Netherlands Indies currency in order 
to avoid the problems of a long transition period. Events after the surrender 
showed this to have been a wise decision.
9. D. van Eck, Juridische aspecten van geld: valutaproblemen bij decolonisatie 
(Deventer: Kluwer, 1970), p. 134.
10. C. F. Scheffer, Het bankwezen in Indonesie sedert het uitbreken van de tweede 
wereldoorlog (Jakarta: Noordhoff-Kolff, 1951), p. 79.
11. Report of the meeting of departmental heads, August 13, 1945, OBB, 1, p. 19; 
Logemann to Queen Wilhelmina, October 7, 1945, ib id ., p. 269.
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In Kalimantan and East Indonesia, where the Allies imposed their authority rela­
tively early, they were able to introduce NICA currency with little difficulty, though 
Japanese currency continued to circulate on Sulawesi until February 1, 1946, and on 
Flores until mid-February, while on Belitung it was a commercial company, the Billi- 
ton-Maatschappij, which itself issued the first temporary postwar currency.12 On 
Java and Sumatra, however, the Allies were not able to occupy more than their few 
coastal enclaves and, under the surrender provisions dictated by the Allies, the 
Japanese thus retained responsibility for maintaining law, order, and the political 
status quo over large areas o f the country, a task for which they often had some 
lack of enthusiasm. Ch. van der Plas, representative of the Netherlands Indies 
government to SEAC [South East Asia Command], quickly recognized a potentially 
serious problem: if the Japanese currency were declared worthless, or even if it 
lost its value as a result of the Japanese defeat, the Japanese would not be able to 
carry on their administrative tasks.13 14 Japanese administration as such had little 
to commend it to the Dutch, but they considered any administration better 
than the chaos they anticipated developing in a power vacuum. Dutch monetary 
policies in the postwar Netherlands Indies thus began paradoxically with a delib­
erate attempt to support the occupation currency of the enemy. Not only did the 
Japanese money remain legal tender on Java and Sumatra, but there was a ban on 
the import into Java o f other currency, including NICA money, and on one occasion 
the Dutch crew of a plane from Balikpapan was arrested for bringing in NICA money.
Distribution problems severely limited Dutch currency policies; outside the 
Allied perimeters Java and Sumatra remained wholly inaccessible to the kind of gov­
ernment apparatus necessary if the Dutch were to organize a rapid change of cur­
rency, and the Dutch could do little about this outside the framework of their gen­
eral political relations with the Republic. Having accepted these restrictions, they 
were faced with the question of whether to introduce NICA money within the perim­
eters of Allied-occupied territory. The general arguments in favor of this were 
strong. The Dutch had viewed technical excellence of administration as the corner­
stone of their colonial rule in the twentieth century, and careful control of the 
monetary system was a part of this. They might expect the task of economic recon­
struction in the Netherlands Indies to take some time, but without control of the 
financial situation, they could not even make a start. The Dutch were also sensi­
tive to the likely economic consequences for the unwise and poor if they left Japa­
nese currency in circulation. A prolonged period of uncertainty and instability was 
likely to benefit only those in a position to manipulate the situation to the disadvan­
tage o f others.111 Politically, too, arguments for introduction seemed compelling, 
for the Dutch were being hurt by their inability to issue their own currency and by 
their enforced reliance on the currency of the defeated and disliked enemy occupa­
tion forces. At a time when "whiff of grapeshot" theories for dealing with the Re­
public were influential, inability to control the currency was viewed as a highly 
undesirable sign of powerlessness.15 With the Republic still seen as representing 
anarchical tendencies, rather than a coherent opposition, it seemed that "monetary
12. Nieuwsgier, February 2, 15, 1946; Spinosa Cattela, "Monetaire Problemen," 
p. 264.
13. Van der Plas to van Mook, September 18, 1945, OBB, 1, p. 124.
14. Van Mook, for example, argued that the common man had retained his faith in 
the Dutch, and they should not let him go to the wall. Van Mook to Gotzen [Direc­
tor of Finance] and van Buttingha Wichers [President of the Java Bank], November 
16, 1945, ib id ., 2, p. 86.
15. Report o f the cabinet meeting, September 30, 1945, ib id ., 1, p . 195.
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economic policy can become one of our best weapons in the struggle for the restora­
tion of order and peace in this country."16 The idea of issuing the currency only 
in the occupied enclaves, however, had changed the terms on which its introduc­
tion could be considered. Implicit in such a restriction was a recognition that the 
Japanese currency, whatever its legal status and economic basis, actually had a 
certain economic pow er.17 This faced the Dutch with a problem of quasi-interna­
tional financial relations: could NICA money, based in three-and-a-half enclaves 
on Java, outperform the Japanese currency with its basis in the hinterland?
It was politically and economically essential for the Dutch that NICA money re­
tain its value in contrast to the sharply depreciating Japanese currency. This, it 
was realized, was not a matter of relative political confidence; it was widely believed, 
both amongst the population at large and within Dutch ruling circles, that some offi­
cial value would ultimately be set on the Japanese currency, and once the principle 
of exchangeability had been established, the rate of exchange would have to be 
fixed on more or less economic grounds.18 Indeed, it was NICA money, not the 
Japanese money, that would be vulnerable politically, since the Republic in antici­
pation had refused it recognition. Within the Allied enclaves, therefore, the ex­
change rate was likely to be set by the relative buying power of the two currencies. 
Buying power in turn depended on imports, for there was still relatively little manu­
facturing or food production within the enclaves, and here the Dutch were at a 
serious disadvantage. There was a severe postwar shortage of goods and cargo 
space, while the Dutch lacked the foreign exchange and credit needed to buy what 
was available, and were further hampered by black bans against their shipping im­
posed by pro-Republic waterside workers in Australian ports. And without con­
sumer goods to sell for NICA money, there was little the Dutch could do to make 
its possession an attractive proposition. The NIGIEO (Nederlands-Indisch Gou- 
vernements Im- en Export-Organisatie), set up in 1943 with an official monopoly of 
trade to and from the Netherlands Indies in many commodities, together with the 
Department of Economic Affairs of which it was a part, eventually succeeded in or­
ganizing a limited flow of goods to Indonesia. These included redundant American 
war supplies and goods purchased with Canadian credit and shipped across the 
Pacific in Netherlands Indies government vessels specially built in Oregon during 
the war. It was some time into 1946, however, before this flow reached sizeable 
proportions and until then there was little to give value to NICA money.
In the second place, there was the problem of Netherlands Indies currency 
issued in the prewar period. In 1942, there had been about f.362.5 million in Java 
Bank notes in circulation, together with f.100 million in government currency notes 
and f.195 million in coins.19 Moreover, according to intelligence reports, after the 
capitulation the Japanese had spent f.57.5 million in prewar Java Bank notes which 
they had taken from the main Java Bank safe in Bandung. 20 Of this total of about 
f.715 million, there was little in active circulation, due to hoarding, but this was 
likely to change if people interpreted the introduction of NICA guilders as a sign 
of returning economic stability. On behalf of the Netherlands Indies government,
16. Kuiper, note, in ib id ., 3, p. 148.
17. Gotzen to van Mook, November 12, 1945, ib id ., 2, p. 55.
18. Van der Plas to van Mook, September 18, 1945, ib id., 1, p. 125; Logemann to 
Queen Wilhelmina, October 7, 1945, ib id., p. 269; Gotzen to van Mook, November 
12, 1945, ib id ., 2, p. 53.
19. Gotzen to van Mook, November 12, 1945, ib id ., p. 54.
20. Ibid.; Report of the cabinet meeting, September 30, 1945, ib id., 1, p. 195.
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van Mook had in fact promised that prewar currency would retain its value in rela­
tion to NICA money.21 Whatever exchange rate might ultimately be decided for Japa­
nese currency, therefore, a substantial amount of what would have to be regarded 
as NICA money was already in potential circulation. With many of these notes pre­
sumably in the interior, where, unlike NICA money, they were accepted as legal 
tender, and without an effective tax apparatus or a large stock of consumer goods 
to sell, the Netherlands Indies government had no immediate means of reducing cir­
culation: to have added the new currency to the economy at this stage would simply 
have encouraged further inflation. 22 A partial solution appeared possible through 
use of a device applied already in Kalimantan and East Indonesia, where there was a 
similar problem of prewar currency still in circulation. There only Java Bank and 
currency notes of f.10 and below were authorized as legal tender alongside NICA 
money; higher denominations were simply frozen until control over the money sup­
ply was regained, and thus the inflationary effect of too much money was reduced.23 24
On Java, however, the situation was complicated by the continued circulation of 
Japanese currency and by the existence of an unofficial rate of exchange between 
it and the prewar guilder that, at 10-12:1, was much too far below the rate of 33:1 
which the Dutch had in mind. 21* If NICA money were introduced, the risk was that 
its value would be dragged down by that of the prewar guilder. 25 The situation, 
in short, was highly unpromising for NICA money, and a representative of the Java 
Bank gave the blunt advice:
. . . under the present circumstances an introduction of new Netherlands 
Indies currency on Java and Sumatra would have catastrophic effects on 
our monetary system, with all the resulting consequences for the economic 
development of these regions. 26 [Original emphasis]
Such considerations, indirectly political, were supplemented by direct argu­
ments which carried steadily more force as the Dutch took growing account of the 
power of the Republic. Unfortunately for the Dutch, van Mook’s 1942 decision 
against an Indische design for the postwar currency had led to the printing of 
notes with a Dutch text and dominated by a picture of Queen Wilhelmina, which 
thereby cast a suggestion of doubt on Dutch announcements that they were not re­
turning simply to restore the old colonial order. The few NICA notes which inad­
vertently entered circulation on Java in 1945 aroused such aversion from both the 
Republicans and their government that the Dutch were somewhat doubtful whether 
they would be accepted even in the enclaves. Van der Plas predicted "widespread
21. Gotzen to van Mook, February 18, 1946, ib id ., 3, p. 406.
22. Note concerning Netherlands Indies currency [January 17, 1946] [hereafter 
NIC note], ARA, Algemene Secretarie 1e zending [hereafter Alg. Sec. 7], box 
[kist] 1, file [dossier] 27; Logemann to Queen Wilhelmina, October 7, 1945, OBB,
1, p. 269.
23. Van Mook to Logemann, October 16, 1945, ib id ., p. 372.
24. General Treasury to van Mook, February 7, 1946, Proc. Cen. 894, 2; Gotzen 
to van Mook, November 12, 1945, OBB, 2, p. 53.
25. Observation of the few NICA notes which had inadvertently entered circulation 
suggested that it would fall even lower. In October 1945, NICA guilders fetched 
only four Japanese guilders. Such figures, however, cannot safely be applied to a 
hypothetical larger circulation. See NIC note.
26. Drs. H. J. Manschot [representative of the Java Bank], note [c. January 
1946], OBB, 3, p. 152n.
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discontent, outbursts of violence and possibly a popular revolt" if the notes were 
introduced. 27 Moreover, he pointed out, whether or not NIC A money circulated in 
the enclaves, its proscription by the Republic ensured that no one living outside 
them would dare to sell produce in exchange for the currency. The cities, largely 
dependent on imports for their food supplies, would be cut off. Finally, in view of 
the Republic's hostility to NICA money, the tentative negotiations towards a politi­
cal settlement which were under way would be jeopardized and, moreover, the Dutch 
would bear the blame for what the world would see as unnecessary provocation. 28
Thus the currency of the Japanese military administration not only remained in 
circulation but continued as the official tender of the government. The Allies had 
captured about two-and-a-half thousand million guilders in Japanese currency when 
they occupied the main banks and the Kolff printing works in Jakarta in early Octo­
ber, and it was this, together with such subsidiary acquisitions as forty chests of 
Japanese currency, valued at f.100 million, brought from Bandung by Dakota in 
January, that the Dutch used to finance the costs of restoring their administration.29 
Many Allied needs were met simply by requisition from the Japanese, who were au­
thorized to print extra money to pay for i t . 30 Large sums, however, were also 
spent directly by the Dutch, and the combined result was a rapid increase in the 
money supply. The exact dimensions of this increase are hard to estimate, since 
the available sets o f figures are widely divergent and none is particularly convinc­
ing on close analysis. Moreover, the Dutch also alleged later that the Japanese had 
issued f. 1,500 million more than their records showed. There is a consensus, how­
ever, that an initial circulation of between f . 369 million and f . 2,700 million in August 
1945 rose sharply as a result of postcapitulation spending, reaching perhaps f . 3,500- 
4,000 million and possibly as much as f. 8,000 million. 31 Inflation, already well es­
tablished in Japanese times, continued apace, and Dutch officials, who received 
f. 1,000 (Japanese) per month as "pocket money" (salaries were credited rather than 
paid, in an effort to isolate NICA money from the inflation), found it insufficient 
even for food. 32 The situation was aggravated by the activity of counterfeiters.33
With both the Dutch and the Republic unable, for their respective reasons, to 
issue their own currency, the lines of conflict were drawn more in theory than in 
practice. The small amounts of either currency in circulation served as a taste of 
things to come, rather than as a cause for concern in themselves. Even at this 
stage, however, the Republic was making a serious effort to obstruct the monetary
27. Van der Plas, note [c. January 1946?], ib id ., p. 241n.
28. Ibid.
29. Van Mook to Logemann, October 22-31, 1945, OBB, 1, p. 404; Nieuwsgier, 
January 5, 1946.
30. FO 371/53779.
31. Scheffer, Bankwezen, p . 80; van der Plas to van Mook, September 18, 1945, 
OBB, 1, p. 124; Kuiper, note, ib id ., 3, pp. 148-49; FO 371/53775; FO 371/53806. 
For the allegation of Japanese malpractice, see Ministerie van Financien, "Intrekking 
invasiegeld op Java en Sumatra," September 17, 1946, Alg. Sec. 7, box 1, file 27.
32. NIC note; Regeringsvoorlichtingdienst [hereafter RVD], "Wekelijksehe kroniek 
no. 2," December 15, 1945, archives of the former Ministerie van Kolonien, Rap- 
portage Indonesia [hereafter Rapp. Indon.], box A, file 1.
33. Ra'jat, February 1, 1946, cited in ARA, archief Ministerie van Kolonien, sup­
plement, file 76.
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plans of the Dutch. The newspaper Merdeka announced on October 2, 1945, that 
NICA notes had appeared, and on the same day, in its first financial decree, the 
Republic banned the new Dutch currency. 3k Only on the following day did Sukarno 
issue his decree defining what would be regarded as legal tender. No official pen­
alty for possessing NICA money was laid down at this stage, but inspection patrols 
of pemuda in the pasar, together with unofficial executions of those caught dealing 
in it, made it clear that this ban would be enforced. In itself, the ban was a politi­
cal, rather than an economic act; NICA money was unacceptable at this stage be­
cause it was an aspect of Dutch authority, not because the Republic expected any 
specific undesirable economic or financial effects from its circulation. But the ban 
was effective primarily for economic reasons: exclusion of NICA money from the 
Javanese hinterland transformed the conflict, even before it had started, from one 
between the rival authority of two regimes to one between the rival economic power 
of two regions. This may in fact have been Hatta's intention when announcing that 
the new currency would be based on a-metalism, that is, that it would be backed by 
valuable and durable goods, rather than by gold. 34 5 For the time being at least, it 
put the conflict to the advantage of the Republic.
Political considerations, however, also led the Republic to revise its plans to 
introduce ORI. The initiative here came from the British. Indonesian opinion was 
firmly in favor of issuing ORI as soon as possible. 36 The Dutch, of course, would 
have been glad to advise in the matter, but lacked the necessary sympathetic audi­
ence. The British, however, through whom the Republicans believed they addressed 
the world, were a different matter. In January 1946, M. E. Dening, Foreign Office 
political adviser to SEAC, told representatives of the Republic bluntly that for the 
Republic to issue its own currency would be the best way to wreck the economy of 
the country. 37 His message was reinforced later that month by W. A. M. Doll, a 
treasury official specially sent out as adviser to SEAC, who argued that in issuing 
its own currency the Republic would be marching in the face of the entire organized 
machinery of international cooperation in the monetary economic field. "These are 
international forces," he warned, "which do not let themselves be defied and which 
have a deep rooted aversion to dilettantist experiments in monetary affa irs."38 
These arguments were economic, but they were presented for essentially political 
reasons: in order to keep open the possibility of a negotiated settlement it was 
necessary to avoid reinforcing organizational and structural differences between 
the two sides. The issue of Republican currency would be a step difficult to undo 
and would bring in its wake a cloud of economic difficulties which could only delay
34. Merdeka, October 2, 1945. As the editor of De Nieuwsgier pointed out at the 
time, the circulation in Jakarta had a diversity approaching that of prewar China.
In addition to the four forms of currency with some legal backing--prewar Nether­
lands Indies currency, Japanese currency, NICA money, and ORI—there were Brit­
ish pounds, American dollars, Indian rupees, Straits dollars, and Philippine pesos. 
See Nieuwsgier, January 16, 1946.
35. Merdeka, November 21, 28, 1945.
36. See, for example, Merdeka, November 28, 1945, January 19, 1946.
37. [W. F. L. Graaf] van Bylandt [special envoy and plenipotentiary minister to 
the Lieut. Governor-General], Memorandum, January 19, 1946, OBB, 3, p. 171; 
van Bylandt, notes on discussions at Allied Headquarters, January 22, 1946, ib id ., 
p. 195; Kuiper, report [dated January 21, 1946, but apparently written later], 
ib id ., p. 240, n. 6.
38. FO 371/53781.
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and complicate a settlement. It was presumably a more explicit statement of this 
attitude that led Sjahrir to undertake at least not to introduce the new currency 
before he had considered van Mook's proposals.39 40123 This undertaking, however, be­
came somewhat irrelevant with the capture of the stock of Republican currency 
notes in mid-January, coyly referred to in the Republican press at the time as 
"technical difficulties. " 1,0 Sjahrir also believed that some sort of understanding 
had been reached whereby neither side would issue its own currency until a settle­
ment had been achieved. Whether he misinterpreted the situation or was deceived, 
he was soon disappointed by the turn of events.
The British did not play an entirely consistent game. In October 1945, accord­
ing to reports, one group of British officers was advising Hatta to accept the NICA 
money while another group encouraged him to go ahead with issuing Republican 
money. At the same time, Mountbatten was urging that NICA money not be intro­
duced, in order to avoid provoking the Indonesians. ^ Two months later, however, 
on December 10, Lt. Gen. Christison, Allied Commander in the Netherlands Indies, 
wrote to van Mook asking him to introduce NICA money into circulation on January 
1, 1946. Moderate Indonesians, he argued, were likely to accept it (this came as a 
surprise to the Dutch, whose own intelligence sources suggested quite the oppo­
site), and it was the only way to prevent a collapse of the economic structure of the 
region .1,2 Christison was also highly dissatisfied with the temporary arrangements 
for crediting salary and paying pocket money to the troops. British troops, it was 
argued, wanted solid payment, in an internationally recognized currency, rather 
than gifts of Japanese occupation money, and the British had moral objections to 
paying their workforce and suppliers in Japanese currency when it was losing value 
by the week. 93 These complaints were partly met by a payment of f.2 million in 
NICA money to the British for use by soldiers in army canteens, on condition that 
it was not used outside. After the Dutch had forcefully argued the technical diffi­
culties of introducing the new currency by the proposed deadline, it was agreed to 
postpone the introduction to February 1. In the interval, however, the Dutch 
Minister of Colonies, J. H. A. Logemann, suspecting that Christison was acting on 
his own initiative, made enquiries in London and found that neither the Treasury,
39. NIC note.
40. RVD, "Wekelijksche Kroniek no. 4," January 2, 1946, Rapp. Indon. , box A, 
file 1. The Dutch had their own "technical difficulties" getting their supplies of 
NICA money through the pro-Indonesian dock strikes in Australia, although these 
difficulties were not in fact reponsible for the delays in issuing NICA money, since 
some supplies were flown in, and the remainder arrived early in March 1946 aboard 
the Australian warship Bungaree. By early February,the Dutch had reportedly 
also begun printing 1$ and 10$ notes in Kolff's printing works in Jakarta. See 
Gotzen, "Nota inzake muntzuivering," February 7, 1946, Proc. Gen. 894,2; Nieuws- 
gier, March 9, 1946; and Independent [Jakarta], February 11, 1946.
41. Extracts from Indonesian broadcasts over Radio Batavia, December 21, 1945, 
Alg. Sec. 7, box 1, file 37; India Office Records [hereafter IOR] , file no. 
L/WS/1/176.
42. Christison to van Mook, December 10, 1945, Alg. Sec. 1, box 1, file 27; NIC 
note. British Intelligence, moreover, agreed with the Dutch; see Kuiper, Note, 
[January 1946], OBB, 3, p. 147n.
43. NIC note.
44. Ibid.; Kuiper, report, OBB, 3, p. 241.
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nor the Bank of England, nor the War Office knew anything of Christison's actions. 
The War Office, he reported to van Mook with evident satisfaction, was going to get 
in touch with Christison.1,5
Abruptly, however, the British and Dutch reversed positions. Van Mook's 
codetelegram of February 5, reporting to Logemann that the monetary measures had 
indeed been halted, noted that the halt would not be indefinite. Allied stocks of 
Japanese currency would run out in six weeks at the latest and action would have 
to be taken before then. 96 In an inflationary economy, the Dutch had been prodi­
gious spenders, and of the two-and-a-half thousand million Japanese guilders cap­
tured from the banks and from Kolff s in October only f.450 million remained. 97 The 
reprinting of Japanese notes was considered, but unknown saboteurs had destroyed 
the printing plates for the Japanese notes at Kolff s and it would take two months 
to replace them.1,8 The Dutch also had serious moral and economic reservations in 
the matter, and, moreover, there was a growing feeling that the current state of af­
fairs could not continue indefinitely.119 And finally, there was fear of the conse­
quences for Dutch prestige if the Republicans beat them to the gun in issuing their 
own currency. 45 67890 If a change were to be made, it was felt, this was as good an op­
portunity as any. 51 For the British, on the other hand, the opportunity was not 
as good as any. Both Christison and Dening were nearing the end of their terms of 
duty and both were aware that the introduction of NICA money was likely to sour 
relations between the Dutch and the Republic and to worsen the security situation. 
As they had argued to the Republic, the introduction of a new currency could only 
hamper progress towards a political settlement, and no other kind of settlement was 
then possible. Doll supported them with powerful economic arguments (the same 
arguments used previously by the Dutch to resist introduction), but there was little 
that the British could do. The Dutch could not be expected to govern without 
money. The introduction of NICA money was set for midnight on March 6. An ex­
change rate of 3:100 against the Japanese guilder was laid down. To reduce circu­
lation, only prewar Java Bank and government currency notes of f.5  and below were 
accepted in exchange for the new currency; the rest were frozen. And the govern­
ment adopted a policy of paying its employees only the minimum necessary propor­
tion of their salaries. 52 In short, the chief economic obstacles to the success of the 
new currency were tackled as well as possible. The political obstacles remained 
another matter.
Predictably, the introduction of NICA money did little to sweeten relations be­
tween the Republic and the Dutch, or for that matter between the Republic and the 
British. In his earlier attempts to persuade the Dutch to introduce their new cur­
rency, Christison had promised to announce officially that he, as Allied Commander,
45. Logemann to van Mook, January 29, 1946, ib id ., p. 290.
46. Van Mook, "Codetelegram no. 212," February 5, 1946, ib id ., p . 291n.
47. FO 371/53781.
48. Drs. L. Korthals [Deputy Director of Finance] to van Mook, March 30, 1946, 
OBB, 3, p. 689.
49. Kuiper, note, ib id ., p. 148; NIC note.
50. Van Mook to Gotzen and van Hoogstraten [Director of Economic Affairs], Febru­
ary 20, 1946, OBB, 3, pp. 418-20.
51. Gotzen to van Mook, January 30, 1946, ib id ., p. 316.
52. NIC note.
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regarded it as the only legal tender in the land. His successor, Lt. Gen. Stop ford 
kept this promise; indeed, even without the promise he could hardly have done 
otherwise. He issued the following brief proclamation on March 6:
Whereas
1st a sound currency system shall be introduced in order to prevent com­
plete collapse of the economic structure of the country and to create a 
medium of exchange as a condition for the restoration of normal trade, 
2nd the Netherlands being the recognized sovereign power, the sole legal 
tender will be the N.E.I. currency, which is the internationally ac­
cepted currency of this country. 53 54
Sjahrir was very upset by the introduction, and van Mook thought that the Republi­
cans were generally more hostile to the new currency than to the landing of Dutch 
troops. Sh The Indonesian press and radio began a vigorous campaign against what 
was called the Dutch "economic offensive." The Republican Ministry of Finance 
immediately issued a statement that the presidential decree of October 1945, setting 
Japanese and prewar Netherlands Indies currency as the only legal tender until ORI 
was issued, remained in force, and a penalty of five years imprisonment was laid 
down for those found using NICA money. 55 Colonel Singgih of the TRI Regiment in 
Tanggerang also issued a warning that anyone caught with NICA money would be 
punished, 56 and the bodies of those unfortunate enough to be discovered by the 
pemuda carrying NICA notes began to appear in public places with the offending 
notes attached as a warning. 57
With such events occurring even within the Dutch-controlled enclaves, shop­
keepers were understandably reluctant to accept the new currency and people 
traveling beyond Jakarta positively refused it, until black market operators set up 
currency exchanges at appropriate points along the demarcation line. 58 There were 
strikes in Jakarta's port, Tanjung Priok, against payment in NICA money, and the 
Republican branch of the combined police force in Jakarta refused to accept it . 59 
(Dutch intelligence suggested that this reluctance had more to do with dissatisfac­
tion at the rate at which the workers were to be paid than with a principled aver­
sion to NICA money, and indeed rumors were appearing in the Republican press 
that the salaries which the Dutch had been paying their Indonesian employees in 
Japanese currency were to be converted to the new currency at a rate of 50:1 or 
less, instead of the official 33: 1.) 60 Supplies of rice from the interior dwindled,
53. Lt.-Gen. Sir M. G. N. Stop ford, Comd. Allied Forces, Netherlands East Indies 
Proclamation, "Currency," March 6, 1946, copy in ARA, archief C. W. A. Abben- 
huis.
54. Van Mook to Logemann, March 11, 1946, OBB, 3, p. 541; IOR, L/P&S/12/1034.
55. Merdeka, March 7, 11, 1946.
56. HQ, 23 Ind. D iv ., Bandung, "Weekly Intelligence Summary no. 17" (March 13, 
1946), Proc. Gen. 549.
57. Ibid., no. 18 (March 20, 1946), no. 19, part 2 (March 27, 1946).
58. Ibid ., no. 17 (March 13, 1946); RVD, "Wekelijksche kroniek no. 14" (April 
14, 1946), Rapp. Indon., box A, file 1; Nieuwsgfer, April 11, 1946.
59. "Verslag van den C.C.O. AMA-CAB voor West- en Midden-Java en de vorsten- 
landen over de tijdvak van Januari t/m Juni 1946," Proc. Gen. 894,5; RVD, "Over- 
zicht Indonesische Pers en Radio," April 13, 1946, Proc. Gen. 863.
60. Nefis Rapport 1-5/CI no. 18, "Het nieuwe geld," June 15, 1946, Alg. Sec. 7, 
box 1, file 27; Merdeka, March 8, 1946.
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and the situation was aggravated by the still unsolved problem of a shortage of 
goods to be bought for NICA money; 61 Logemann objected to wasting good foreign 
exchange on goods to be sold for what he called "the practically worthless NICA- 
paper."62 The immediate result was a slump in the value of the new currency, to 
the dismay of the Dutch. The new guilder fell in value from f.33 (Japanese), to 
f.25 by the end of March, and continued falling steadily in the following months, 
reaching f. 10 in June.63 64 With Dutch exchange offices still offering the new guilders 
at 1:33, there was little interest in converting Japanese currency. Some Dutch, or 
their sympathizers, tried to support the official rate of exchange in the markets by 
insisting to sellers who gave the price of goods in Japanese currency that they be 
allowed to pay in NICA money at the official rate of exchange. Since this insistence 
could sometimes be backed by the Dutch police, sellers often began to give their 
prices in NICA money. The rate of exchange, however, was not affected.61* Even­
tually the Dutch also tried selling small amounts o f Japanese currency for NICA 
money at the official exchange rate. Since those taking advantage of this offer re­
ceived more than twice as many Japanese guilders for their NICA money as they 
were likely to get on the open market, it was hoped that they would be encouraged 
to value NICA guilders more highly, which would eventually result in a more favor­
able rate of exchange. Again, however, there was no lasting e ffe ct .65 In time, it 
became difficult to find sellers willing to take NICA money, even at a low exchange 
rate. The Dutch began to complain that it was accepted only in the NAAFI and the 
YMCA, and they set up a small office where Dutch housewives could exchange f.6  
per week in NICA money for Japanese guilders in order to be able to go shopping 
in the markets.66
Once NICA money had been introduced, there were no longer strong political or 
diplomatic reasons for the Republic to refrain from issuing its own currency. The 
Dutch were seen as having acted in bad faith and, whether or not the Republic was 
aware of it, there was a certain feeling in some foreign financial quarters that, 
assuming the conflict was going to be protracted, an official Republican currency, 
regulated and controlled by the Republican government, was preferable to the con­
tinued circulation of the Japanese currency. 67 This is not to say that the Republi­
can currency would be greeted enthusiastically; the British had kept up a certain 
amount of pressure on the Republic not to go ahead with issuing ORI68 and there 
was no possibility of its receiving international recognition separate from an even­
tual international recognition of the Republic. International reaction, which was 
likely to be muted, was not of fundamental importance to the Republic; what was 
important was whether or not the new currency was a success, and whether or not 
it retained its value and enabled the Republic to bring its economy under some sort 
o f control. Internal political opinion had always strongly favored the introduction 
of ORI, and it was logical, both for the sake of prestige and self-respect and in
61. "Verslag van den C.C.O. AMA-CAB"; FO 371/53787.
62. Report o f the meeting of the War Council, May 8, 1946, OBB, 4, p. 285.
63. Nefis, "Het nieuwe geld"; "Verslag van den C.C.O. AMA-CAB."
64. Van der Plas, note, June 18, 1946, Alg. Sec. 1, box 22, file 12.
65. "Verslag van den C.C.O. AMA-CAB."
66. Mr. N. S. Blom [Director o f Justice] to Logemann, May 2, 1946, OBB, 4, p. 
259; Nieuwsgier, April 26, 1946.
67. FO 371/53806.
68. FO 371/53805.
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order to provide the much-needed mechanisms of economic control, that the Repub­
lic issue its new currency. There was, then, considerable domestic pressure on 
Sjahrir and his Finance Minister Soerachman to go ahead with introducing ORI, and 
this was reinforced by reports that the Dutch were smuggling Japanese currency 
into the Republic. 69 Moreover, like the Dutch, the Republic had a pressing finan­
cial reason for replacing the Japanese currency: they were running out of it. The 
vaults of the Japanese banks in Malang, Surabaya, Yogyakarta, and Solo had yield­
ed between six and seven hundred million Japanese guilders for the use of the Re­
public, 70 somewhat less than the Dutch had obtained. From October 1945 until 
March 1946 the Republic had an income of f.118.5 million, much of it from taxes of 
various kinds, with a proportion from the sale of petrol, forest products, salt, and 
opium. In the same period it spent f . 402.7 million, of which f.246 million, over 58 
percent, went for the army, which was nonetheless critically short of funds. 71 As 
in the case of the Dutch, the Republic’s supply of Japanese currency was a limited, 
depreciating resource, for the Republic was not yet sufficiently organized to collect 
taxes on a scale to match its expenditure. As a matter of economic survival some 
form of action was becoming necessary. 72
Technical difficulties, in the broad sense, had already caused delay and they 
continued to do so. After the Dutch had confiscated the first run of notes in Janu­
ary 1946, printing operations were shifted to the Kolff printing works at Malang in 
East Java. The works, however, were small and could manage only a limited output, 
and so the printers decided to print only one side of the notes, until persuaded by 
a visit from the local army unit that two sides would be more appropriate for the 
national currency of the Republic. Only higher denominations had serial numbers, 
often in fact the same serial number, since there was no mechanism for automatically 
rolling the numbers on. It was reported, however, that printing was completed by 
the end of July. 73 74
Economic considerations, nonetheless, caused the Republic to act with circum­
spection. In his original consideration of the currency problem, Maramis had noted 
the problem of excess circulation and had suggested a solution in the partial ex­
change and partial deposit of prewar Netherlands Indies and Japanese occupation 
currency. Maramis, however, had left the cabinet in November 1945, and his suc­
cessors apparently did no more to reduce circulation in preparation for the influx 
of new money than to urge the population to save. 7<t 1946, however, saw the return 
of numbers of Indonesians who had spent the war in The Netherlands. Many had 
been students there, and some had received financial and economic training, such 
as Sumitro Djojoadikusumo and Ong Eng Die. These two men were soon playing im­
portant roles in the formulation of financial and economic policy, and their influence
69. Ministerie van Financien, "Dagrapport: Uitgifte ’republikeinsch' geld," January 
30, 1946, Alg. Sec. 1, box 1, file 27; FO 371/53805.
70. "De financieele crisis van de TRI," archive of the former Ministerie van Kolo- 
nien, file M30, June 18, 1946; FO 371/53806.
71. "De financieele crisis van de TRI."
72. The reprinting of Japanese currency could, of course, have been a solution, 
for there had been a printing works producing Japanese currency at Magelang dur­
ing the occupation, but I have not been able to discover its subsequent fate. The 
fact was, however, that the issue of ORI needed no justification within the Republic.
73. FO 371/53807.
74. Merdeka, December 19, 1945.
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led to speculation in Allied circles that the Republic had somehow managed to find 
a Swiss financial adviser. 75 Like the Dutch from whom they had received their 
training, in approaching the problem of introducing the new currency they paid a 
great deal of attention to the problem of excessive circulation of the old.
The first step towards solving both the problem of excessive liquidity and that 
of the government's emptying coffers was the floating of a National Loan (Pindjaman 
Nasional) on May 9, 1946. Citing the obligation of the population to support Repub­
lican goals, the government set the loan at f. 1,000 million, half to be subscribed by 
Java and Madura, half by Sumatra. Repayment was to be within forty years and, 
when the new currency was issued, all loans were to be converted to it at the offi­
cial rate. 76 The loan attracted only about f.318 million on Java and f.208 million on 
Sumatra, most reportedly by small depositors. 77 The wealthy of all races, it was 
complained, abstained, and the result was disappointing. Further measures were 
needed to control the money supply, and on July 12 a regulation was introduced 
for Java and Madura that all cash had to be deposited in banks by July 15. The 
only exceptions were that householders were permitted f. 3,000 per month to cover 
expenses, unmarried individuals f . 1,000, and businesses f. 1,000-10,000, depending 
on profits. 78 As the much-postponed day of issue of the ORI approached, it was 
announced that all remaining money should be deposited by October 26 (October 30 
for businesses), with the exception of f.50 per person to tide the population over 
the few days before the planned date of issue, October 31. All Japanese currency 
then in deposit would be converted to rupiah at the official rate of 50:1, after due 
investigation into how its owners had come by it. A further R p .l would be dis­
tributed to each person in order to get circulation going again and in recognition 
of the f.50 retained during the transition period. Any Japanese currency still in 
circulation would then be declared worthless and would not be exchangeable for 
ORI. 79 These measures were based on the postwar geldsaneering carried out in 
The Netherlands by Finance Minister Lieftinck, who had in fact taught Sumitro in 
Rotterdam. His saneering was a political rather than an economic act. Under it, 
a new design of bank note was introduced and people could only exchange their old 
banknotes for new if they gave an adequate account of how they had received them. 
The intention was that no one should profit from activities during the German occu­
pation which they could not justify in public. The so-called tientje van Lieftinck 
( f . 10) was issued to every person in order to start circulation off again and to 
cover the period up until people received their first wages or salary in new notes.
In the Indonesian case, compulsory deposit made economic sense as a means of 
avoiding excessive circulation of currency during the transition period, and the 
consequent inflationary effects on the new currency. It also helped alleviate suspi­
cions that speculators were profiting at the expense of the people. It had addition­
al political advantages. In many Republican areas, opposition groups with ties to 
independent and independent-minded armed groups both in and out of the army 
were resisting the efforts of the Republican leaders to create a strong state appara­
tus and entrench their own positions. One of the strengths of such groups in their
75. FO 371/53812.
76. Merdeka, May 9, 10, 1946.
77. G. W. Overdijkink, Het Indonesische probleem: nieuwe feiten (Amsterdam: 
Keizerskroon, 1948), p. 141; "Proces-verbaal Margono Djojoadikusumo," March 30, 
1949, Proc. Gen. 655.
78. Merdeka, July 26, 27, 1946.
79. Ibid.; Overdijkink, Het Indonesische probleem, p. 141.
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attempts to avoid government control, which they interpreted as partisan control 
by groups which happened to be the government, was their independent economic 
base. For political reasons, then, they could never have been persuaded to put 
their funds at the disposal of the government, but it was difficult for them to re­
fuse this demand when it was presented as part of an economic exercise of which no 
one could disapprove.80
The introduction of ORI made a noteworthy contribution to the prestige and 
power of the Republic within its own borders. In a radio address to the people, 
Hatta introduced it as a symbol of independence and the basis for economic develop­
ment. 81 As an instrument for attacking the Dutch it was less of an innovation, 
though it did reinforce the exclusion of Dutch economic influence from the interior 
already established by bans on possession of NICA money. Within the urban en­
claves the field of currency now offered additional scope for conflict, although on 
the same lines as before. Two currencies, each backed by a rival government, 
were already competing for preference in the market place and a favorable exchange 
rate. ORI now replaced one of those currencies, and this widened the scope for 
action by the Republic, since it now had a currency it could positively promote, but 
also increased its vulnerability. The stakes were higher, but the conflict itself was 
materially unchanged.
During the year prior to the introduction of ORI, organized Republican hostil­
ity had contributed to the difficulties of the NICA money, but the fundamental 
causes of those difficulties had lain in the currency's own weaknesses which the 
Dutch themselves had recognized at the time of issue and which were independent 
of Republican monetary tactics. The most fundamental of these was its position as 
the currency of an economically non-self-supporting enclave. Unable to buy rice 
from the interior or more luxury goods from abroad, NICA money initially derived 
its value primarily from the expectation that it would eventually have buying power. 
The four months following its introduction, in which its value slipped to one half, 
gave the Dutch great cause of concern. Apart from ineffectual direct interventions 
into the money market (see above, p. 125), they concentrated on the import of 
goods, both as a monetary measure and in order to satisfy demand amongst the 
growing civil and military establishment in the enclaves. The problem of the unac­
ceptability of NICA money for buying products from the interior could not be tack­
led by such supply-side economics, but, as long as Japanese currency circulated 
freely on both sides of the border and as long as NICA money maintained a reason­
able rate against it , there was a relatively stable situation, far from satisfactory 
for the Dutch, but at least not alarming. By the time that ORI was introduced, 
more than a year after the Japanese surrender, the pasar exchange rate of the 
NICA guilder with the Japanese guilder had stabilized at around 1:15-20, 82 and 
preparations were finally under way to replace NICA currency with new gold-backed 
notes of the Java Bank. 83 The supply of manufactured goods purchaseable with 
NICA money was also reaching respectable proportions.
80. One example, cited in Dutch sources, is that of Dr. Moewardi of the Barisan 
Banteng in Solo, who, together with Tan Malaka and Achmad Subardjo, tried to set 
up a bank and to obtain recognition of it as a deposit and issue bank for exchange 
purposes. When the government refused, however, there was little they could do. 
See P. A. Ursone [adviser to the Director of Economic Affairs], "De invoering van 
het Republikeinse geld," December 4, 1946, Alg. Sec. 7, box 1, file 27.
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The issue of ORI presented the Netherlands Indies government with one imme­
diate problem. With Japanese notes becoming worthless in the interior, those peo­
ple who had not deposited their money in Republican banks would probably rush to 
exchange their cash at the official Dutch exchange offices in the enclaves. This 
was dealt with fairly effectively by an announcement that exchange offices would 
close for the last time on October 30, 1946, though the Dutch felt some reluctance 
to be seen responding in any way to the monetary policies of the Republic. 81*
With the introduction of ORI, however, the Dutch were also given an opportuni­
ty to improve their position. As Japanese currency no longer circulated, there was 
no longer a neutral medium of exchange between the enclaves and the Republic.
The Republic intended the rupiah to take over the functions of the Japanese guil­
der, but the Dutch, of course, objected to this. The circulation of former occupa­
tion currency, freely exchangeable with the legal tender of the land, for a limited 
period in the interests of economic stability, differed fundamentally from the circu­
lation of the currency of what was at best a rival government, at worst a band of 
rebels. As far as the Dutch were concerned, ORI could not simply inherit the posi­
tion of Japanese currency and, in particular, could not be given any official status 
or rate of exchange whatever. They realized, however, that this position would 
lead to the establishment of black market currency exchanges to facilitate trade 
across the border, to the disadvantage of everyone except the currency traders 
themselves. On this basis the Dutch authorities approached the Republicans for a 
deal: they would permit the possession of ORI on Java and Sumatra in exchange for 
removal of the Republic's ban on possession of NICA money, at least in the so-called 
randgebieden, the areas surrounding the Dutch enclaves, or even throughout the 
territory of the Republic. They emphasized that the proposal was simply one of 
tolerance and specifically excluded any recognition of ORI as legal tender, or even 
the establishment of any kind of exchange rate for i t . 84 5
As this proposal was more or less consistent with the de facto recognition which 
the Republic was then working towards in the negotiations leading to the Linggajati 
Agreement, the Republican delegation of Soerachman, Maramis, and Sabaroeddin 
received it favorably. They were unable to persuade the Dutch to tolerate ORI in 
Kalimantan and East Indonesia as well, but they obtained a clause providing for 
special negotiations between the respective Departments of Economic Affairs to facil­
itate trade between the Republic and the Outer Islands.86 The proposal was then 
referred to Yogya, where it must have come in for some careful consideration. In 
its favor was the semirecognition it gained from the Dutch and the need to create 
some sort of momentum, or at least a favorable atmosphere,for the Linggajati nego­
tiations, together with some relief from economic inconvenience and suffering for 
the people in and around the occupied cities. It also promised to spare the rupiah 
from Dutch repression, though until then the Dutch had always preferred economics 
to crude coercion in trying to influence the monetary regime in their enclaves, for, 
as long as the enclaves remained dependent on Republican rice, the Dutch could 
hardly take effective measures against the rupiah necessary to buy it . 87 On the 
other hand, if the proposal were for toleration of both currencies throughout Java
84. Ministerie van Financien, "Intrekking invasiegeld op Java en Sumatra," Septem­
ber 17, 1946, Alg. Sec. 7, box 1, file 27; Korthals to van Mook, October 24, 1946, 
OBB, 5, p. 639.
85. Korthals to van Mook, October 24, 1946, ib id ., p. 639.
86. Ibid.; Korthals to van Mook, October 30, 1946, Alg. Sec. 7, box 1, file 27.
87. De Javasche Bank, "Uitgifte Republikeinsch geld," October 23, 1946, Ministerie 
van Kolonien, file L16, March 25, 1947.
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and Sumatra, it seemed to imply a de facto recognition of Dutch sovereignty in 
Jakarta, something the Republic had not been prepared to concede at any stage, 
regardless of concessions it had made concerning Dutch-controlled areas of the 
Outer Islands.. Moreover, it would open the Republic to NICA money, thereby po­
tentially weakening the economic force with which the rupiah could battle for domi­
nance in Jakarta, not to mention the numerous undesirable internal consequences 
of having NICA money circulating within the Republic. When the proposal returned 
to the Dutch, therefore, Yogya had ratified it, but only on the basis of very nar­
row randgebieden, and in these terms it was signed on November 19, 1946. 88
Having failed to obtain significant change in the situation, the Dutch recognized 
the limits of their position: as long as NICA money could not buy rice from the in­
terior, they could not expect it to be the only currency circulating in Jakarta. On 
the other hand, by ensuring a flow of purchaseable goods, they could guarantee 
that the NICA guilder retained a respectable value. The Dutch realized that the 
strength of NICA money was circumscribed by their overall strategic position, par­
ticularly their confinement to the enclaves. Thus they came more and more to see 
the solution to their problems in the abolition of that enclave status, either by a 
full political settlement with the Republic or by military expansion of the enclaves 
into economically self-supporting units. It was the latter option that they were 
eventually to follow, though this was a decision taken with far more than the mone­
tary system in mind.
The announcement in Ra'jat on October 3, 1946, that the introduction of ORI 
was imminent and that undeposited Japanese currency would become worthless, 
sent prices soaring throughout Java, as people, skeptical about seeing their money 
again after it had been deposited, rushed to the markets to convert their cash into 
goods.89 The Republican press in Jakarta accused Chinese of coming into the mar­
kets with jute sacks full of Japanese currency to buy whatever they could, and the 
price of rice in the city soared. 90 The unofficial rate of exchange against the NICA 
guilder reportedly fell to 120:1 and there was increased activity at official currency 
exchanges. 91 According to one report, food prices rose 3-4,000 percent and cloth­
ing prices 1-2,000 percent in the days just before the introduction of the new cur­
rency. 92 In other respects, however, the issue of ORI ran fairly smoothly. The 
distribution of rupiah ran ahead of schedule,with most areas of the Republic on 
Java receiving them by October 27. Hatta announced on October 29 that the buy­
ing power of the rupiah should be about the same as the Netherlands Indies guilder 
before the war and that this could be equated with 0.5 grams pure gold, though this 
did not imply any adherence to a gold standard. 93 94 (Dutch experts were quick to 
pick up an internal inconsistency here: the gold-backed guilder had been worth 
only approximately 0.34 grams in gold.)99 On October 31, repayment began of money
88. Ibid.; Ra'jat, November 20, 1946.
89. Polisi Negara, Yogyakarta, statement, October 27, 1946, Proc. Cen. 470;
Ra'jat, October 3, 1946.
90. Ra'jat, October 21, 1946; AMACAB, Afd. Intelligence & Loyaliteitsonderzoek, 
Report, November 22, 1946, Proc. Cen. 544.
91. De Javasche Bank, "Uitgifte Republikeinsch Geld"; FO 371/53834.
92. Overdijkink, Het Indonesische probleem, p. 142.
93. Merdeka, October 31, 1946. See also "Proces-verbaal Margono Djojoadikusumo," 
March 30, 1949.
94. De Javasche Bank, "Uitgifte Republikeinsch geld."
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compulsorily deposited before the changeover (though it was limited to Rp.100 per 
person per month in order to restrain inflation) and from November 7 restricted 
amounts could be redeemed from the national loan. 95 There was some criticism of 
the quality of the paper and printing--Hatta reportedly suggested that the paper 
was so bad that it would in fact be hard to imitate 96--but all in all the period of 
transition seemed to have been weathered without difficulty.
In Jakarta there was a sense of euphoria at the arrival of the long-awaited ORI 
notes, and slametan and dance parties accompanied the ceremonial distribution of 
single rupiah to the Indonesian population.9' The new money was much in demand, 
and the four-and-a-half million rupiah reportedly brought secretly into the city by 
RAPWI (Repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and Internees) and other trains was 
insufficient to meet it. 98 People expected its introduction to mean an end to infla­
tion, and the wish was in part self-fulfilling. It had been agreed that there would 
be no official exchange rate between the rupiah and the NICA guilder, but, if both 
were compared to the Japanese guilder, prices in rupiah seemed lower. The greater 
such differences in price, the greater the demand for the rupiah, which, in turn, 
pushed its value still higher against the NICA guilder. If the official exchange rate 
between rupiah and Japanese guilder were compared directly with the normal unoffi­
cial rate between Dutch and Japanese guilders, this produced a rupiah-NICA guilder 
exchange rate of 1:3; if the comparison were based on the official rate between 
Dutch and Japanese guilders, it came out to 1:1.5. Republican posters in various 
parts of the city informed the population that ORI would be introduced at par with 
NICA money but that it was hoped its value would rise, while other Republican an­
nouncements suggested exchange rates of Rp. l : f .  10-30. 99 Although no political 
recognition of NICA money was intended by these announcements, they were ac­
knowledgment that the Dutch currency had a certain economic power. In the mar­
ket on October 31, however, the rate tended to vary from 1:5 to about 1:13, and 
reportedly actually reached 1:30 in at least one area, while in buying goods the 
rupiah was ten to fifteen times stronger than the NICA guilder.100 Haji Agus Salim, 
it was reported, could eat a full meal for Rp.1.76, while lipstick that cost six NICA 
guilders could be had for only sixty Republican cents. Chinese traders tended to 
operate at 1 :2 .5 -3 .0 .101 The railways and trams, still run by the Republic, would 
accept only ORI, as would the telephone exchange, the fishermen at Pasar Ikan,
95. Overdijkink, Het Indonesische probleem, p. 144.
96. FO 371/53834.
97. For a graphic account of the popular mood in Jakarta before and after the in­
troduction of ORI, see the short story by Idroes, "Oeang Republik di Djakarta," 
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98. PID [Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst] , report, Batavia, November 11, 1946, Proc. 
Gen. 3; Hoofd CKS [Centraal Kantoor voor de Statistiek], "Het koersverloop van de 
rupiah t .o .v . den gulden sedert de invoering te Batavia," February 14, 1947, Alg. 
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99. Crimineele Recherche Rapport, "Indonesisch geld," October 30, 1946, Proc. 
Gen. 3; Nieuwsgier, November 2, 1946; Merdeka, October 30, 1946.
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and many small sellers all over Jakarta.102 With all kinds of rumors in circulation 
as to the correct exchange rate and the likely long-term reliability of either cur­
rency, confusion was rife, and even the now invalid Japanese guilders continued 
to circulate for a time. (They remained legal tender, as far as the Republic was 
concerned, in Sumatra and Banten until the issue of provisional local currencies 
later in the Revolution.)103 104 The confusion was exacerbated in the weeks following 
the introduction of ORI by the activities of armed and unarmed supporters of one 
currency or the other, who went about the pasar trying to influence market psy­
chology at the point of a gun or by similar means. Dutch soldiers confiscated ORI 
from some sellers and threatened to shoot others. TRI soldiers in one market in­
sisted that all transactions be conducted in the Republican currency. The Indone­
sian police simply confiscated any NICA money they found and forced sellers to sell 
in ORI at the prices laid down in the official Republican price-fixing regulations.101* 
As hostility to ORI itself was difficult to distinguish under such circumstances from 
hostility to its unrealistic exchange rate, many traders found it wiser simply to 
leave the markets for a few days until things had settled down.105 In rural areas 
around Jakarta, peasants were sometimes required to show ORI notes to patrolling 
lasjkar (irregular troops) as proof of their Republican sympathies. Other Indone­
sians tried more subtle techniques to influence the exchange rate. Small amounts 
of ORI were distributed free at first to get the circulation going, or perhaps simply 
as payment of the Rp. 1 allowance. On October 30, Indonesians were seen buying 
packets of cigarettes, which they distributed to followers,who proceeded to sell the 
individual cigarettes for Rp.0.07 or f.2 (NICA), representing an exchange rate of 
about 1:30. Other Indonesians were seen selling rice at Rp.0.15 or f. 1.50.106
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Despite these and other measures to bolster the rupiah, its exchange rate be­
gan to fall at once. According to figures taken daily at 11:00 a.m. at the largest 
money-changer’ s in Pasar Glodok in Jakarta, the value of the rupiah (in denomina­
tions of Rp.1-10) dropped during its first week of official circulation from f.5.00 
to f.2 .00. By the beginning of December it was f. 1.50; on December 31 it was at 
par with the NICA-guilder and still sinking. It lingered between eighty and ninety 
NICA cents in February, and then plunged again to 50$ in March and 30$ in Ju ly .107 
There were many variations from region to region, even from hour to hour, and 
entirely different exchange rates applied when buying goods, but the dominant ten­
dency was a series of hesitations and falls. In part this was due to inflation of the 
rupiah in the interior. The government’s income from taxes and enterprises was 
meager and it had to meet its obligations by printing money. By January 1947 it 
had printed Rp.310 million, just under half the total prewar circulation of the en­
tire country and equivalent to fifteen thousand million Japanese guilders at the 
October 1946 rate of exchange.108 As the state printing works still had limited 
capacity, production concentrated on notes of Rp.100, the highest denomination.
This in turn led to a severe shortage of change and a tendency for prices to rise 
to meet the currency available to pay them. In circulation, the quality of the notes 
deteriorated rapidly, exacerbating this problem.109 There were reports, too, of 
four or five laborers receiving as their wages a single, shared Rp.100 note which 
could only be exchanged for small change at a considerable lo ss .110 Forgery of 
notes was rife, both within the Republic and in Jakarta, the first forgeries in Ja­
karta reportedly appearing three weeks before the official issue date of ORI. 111 
On one occasion the Chinese editor of the newspaper Chen Pao was found to have 
forged ORI on a large scale in Jakarta. The Dutch police eventually arrested him, 
on charges of disturbing public order, but they did so with some reluctance; the 
rupiah had no legal status under Dutch law and thus it was no crime to falsify i t .112 
The Republic, however, reacted by placing heavy restrictions on travel by Chinese 
between Jakarta and the interior.113 14 Hoarding was also portrayed as a major prob­
lem, and severe regulations were posted against it. Householders were forbidden 
to have more supplies than were necessary for a short period, shopkeepers were for­
bidden to hold large stocks, and farmers were forbidden to retain more of their crops 
than was necessary for their own use, but there was little effective action that could 
be taken in the face of widespread lack of confidence in the currency. 1111 The Re­
107. Tijdelijke bestuursdienst te Buitenzorg, "Circulatie Republikeinsch geld," 
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publican government also attempted to deal with the situation by raising the charges 
for its services, such as postage, and by paying out salaries weekly instead of 
monthly, so as to reduce its employees' disposable income, but the effects were lim­
ited and the unpopularity generated great.
The value of the rupiah, however, declined more steeply in Jakarta than else­
where, and the chief reason for this was the Republican currency's deteriorating 
exchange rate vis-a-vis the NICA guilder. Although not yet abundant, the amount 
of imported goods in Jakarta, on sale for NICA money, had increased substantially, 
and one reason behind the enormous flood of Japanese guilders into Jakarta on the 
eve of the introduction of the ORI was to buy these goods. After the new currency 
appeared, it flowed steadily into Jakarta, where it was exchanged for NICA money, 
and spent in the well-stocked stalls and shops of the metropolis. Idroes described 
the arrival of the speculators:
From the interior there came gods [ dewa] . They spoke tersely, their 
mouths full of figures, their pockets full of Republican money. If any­
one asked them: why have you come to Jakarta?, they would reply brief­
ly: business, and while they spoke their minds wandered to Pasar Glo- 
dok. . . . 11S
That rupiah were brought to Jakarta to purchase what were luxury goods by the 
standards of the Revolution caused resentment in the interior, and the availability 
of these items for guilders weakened the rupiah by creating a demand for guilders.116 
Also important, however, was the constant flow of ORI into Jakarta to pay the sala­
ries of the Republic's many employees there.117 Even though NICA money had, by 
virtue of the weight of the Dutch presence and authority in Jakarta, come to be 
used in an increasing proportion of transactions,118 the value of the rupiah did not 
necessarily suffer as long as a balance was maintained between the outflow of im­
ported goods and the inflow of Javanese rice, on which Jakarta still depended.
This balance, already under heavy pressure from purchasers of imported goods, 
collapsed when the Indonesian armed forces around Jakarta imposed a blockade on 
the city, stopping a large proportion of the imports of rice. The blockade began 
in late October 1946, and it ranged from a simple delaying of rice shipments on 
their way into Jakarta to the imposition of tolls and even confiscation. In some 
places the army revived a Japanese ban on the carrying of more than five liters of 
rice per person and occasionally vegetables, fruit, and eggs were also blockaded.
The blockade was often applied or lifted arbitrarily, and only for brief periods was 
the flow of rice into the city completely stopped, but the overall volume of rice 
crossing the border was severely reduced. The price of available rice rose, but 
with few supplies to spend rupiah on, the value of the ORI sagged, traders in the 
marketplace began refusing to accept it, and, as had once been the case with NICA
115. Idroes, "Oeang Republik di Djakarta."
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money, it became a currency supported primarily by the authority of the govern­
ment that had issued it . 119
In the course of 1947, the Republic made a final attempt to bolster its monetary 
position in the capital. In order to stop damaging shopping visits to Jakarta, it 
placed restrictions on the private import of rupiah into the city. At the same time, 
a Republican central commercial agency (Badan Pusat Djual-Beli) was set up with 
an official monopoly of all trade in and out of Jakarta; firms wishing to trade had 
to sell their goods nominally to the BPD, obtain a certificate to that effect signed 
by the chairman, Ong Eng Die, in Yogya, and repurchase them on the other side 
of the border. Checks at the border by the army and lasjkar were to provide the 
coercive sanction to back this measure. The intention was to ensure, on the one 
hand, that only goods actually necessary for the Revolution were bought in Jakarta, 
and, on the other, that Republican rice was paid for in rupiah, thereby maintaining 
the value of the currency.120 In Jakarta itself operations were supervised briefly 
by a special Republican commissioner, Dr. Halim, known consequently as Dr. Ori, 
but he was appointed only in mid-June 1947 and resigned in despair within three 
weeks.121 Results were meager, for neither the restrictions on importing rupiah 
nor the BPD trade monopoly could be effectively enforced122 and, while the decline 
in the value of the rupiah was perhaps slowed, it was not reversed.
On July 17, 1947, the battle for the control of the currency was overtaken by 
broader events. Pushing out from the occupied cities, Dutch armed forces attacked 
the Republic and captured large swathes of territory, putting an end to the cities’ 
enclave status,which had made the conflict over currency possible. ORI continued 
to circulate within the truncated Republic, and appeared periodically in parts of 
occupied West Java, generally in the vicinity of powerful pro-Republican guerrilla 
groups. As a symbol o f control and authority, currency continued to play an essen­
tially propaganda role in the Revolution on both sides, but its use as an effective 
weapon was over.
Currency became an important element in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict both 
because economic and administrative policies were a significant part of the general 
strategy of both sides, and because the existence of occupied urban enclaves on 
Java and Sumatra created a situation in which economic and political boundaries 
did not coincide. In a period made difficult already by the experience of the Japa­
nese occupation, general problems of postwar reconstruction, and the economic dis­
ruption of the continuing conflict over independence, the Republic and the Dutch 
tried to formulate rational monetary policies not only without the control of events 
necessary to ensure that those policies would work, but often in the face of the 
noncooperation or active hostility of the other side. The outcome satisfied neither
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side: both were forced to delay introducing their currency much longer than they 
had originally intended, both currencies depreciated badly, and neither succeeded 
in ousting the other from the market place. It was only with the Dutch attack, 
intended in considerable part to expand the enclaves into economically self-sup­
porting regions, that Republican monetary influence in Dutch-controlled terri­
tories largely disappeared and the question of currency ceased to play an impor­
tant role in the broader struggle.
